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explaining the mind in terms of computational cognitive science . Inference 
to the best explanation is a valid form of an argument . But it seems that an 
argument which has a form of an inference to the best explanation and is 
supported by a number of other inferences to the best explanation, which are 
supported by a number of other inferences to the best explanation, loses a 
little bit of plausibility with every inference to the best explanation provided 
in its support . Every particular inference is plausible, but in the end we are 
left with a weird feeling that we have accepted an argument which is not sup-
ported well-enough .
In the end, I would like to say that The Centered Mind is an excellent 
book and one of the best examples of efforts to explain the mind scientifi-
cally . The book is definitely not an introductory one, but I would recom-
mend it to anyone who is interested in a scientific explanation of the stream 
of consciousness because Caruthers’s clear writing and thorough referencing 
makes the book accessible even to beginners .
Mihovil Lukić 
Centre for Croatian Studies of University of Zagreb 
Borongajska cesta 83d 
HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
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Elvio Baccarini, In a Better World: Public Reason and Biotechnologies 
(Rijeka: University of Rijeka and Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 2015), 170 pp .
Many books have been published trying to determine the moral status of 
the use of some biotechnologies (e .g . genetic interventions, cloning, moral 
bioenhancement and the extension of human lifespan) . Practical ethics has 
been trying to answer these and similar moral problems for more than a 
century, and all this time the central question has been “What is the right 
thing to do?” . In his recent book Elvio Baccarini does not address this ques-
tion – well aware that in the conditions of reasonable pluralism of moral and 
religious doctrines we cannot publicly agree upon what should we do as a 
political community and which laws and policies are the right or the virtu-
ous ones, he shifts the central question from the domain of practical ethics 
to the domain of political philosophy by asking “What is the legitimate thing 
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to do?” . Instead of an argument from a particular comprehensive doctrine 
(e .g . consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics, Christian ethics), Baccarini 
tries to establish an argumentative strategy that can be supported by various 
reasonable moral and religious doctrines . We should not conclude, however, 
that his book has nothing to do with ethics – in fact, this book presents a 
number of moral arguments and evaluates them according to their ability to 
constitute the legitimacy of a particular decision . In other words, this book 
presents a selection device that helps us determine which moral arguments 
are, and which are not, appropriate for the justification of public laws and 
policies .
Baccarini endorses a form of Rawls’ liberal principle of legitimacy and 
argues that, in order to be legitimate, a law, public policy or political decision 
has to be justified by reasons all reasonable citizens, as free and equal, can be 
expected to endorse in the light of their common human reason . Though the 
author in the first chapter follows Rawls’ idea of public reason, there are still a 
few important differences between Baccarini’s and Rawls’ view . First, Bacca-
rini extends the constrains of public reason to the justification of all political 
decisions, policies and laws, while Rawls applies these constrains only on the 
justification of constitutional essentials . Along with Quong and Williams, 
he accepts the substantive interpretation of public reason and rejects its pro-
cedural alternative, endorsed by Rawls, Estlund and Peter . This first distinc-
tion greatly shapes the entire book since Baccarini imposes more demanding 
legitimacy requirements than Rawls does, i .e . he applies the constrains of 
public reason to a wider scope of public issues . Second, he takes the three basic 
components of eligible conceptions of justice (some basic rights and liberties, 
their priority and the resources to use them) as a premise in public justifi-
cation, instead of Rawls’ two lexically ordered principles of justice . Some 
might argue that this leads Baccarini towards a less egalitarian position than 
the one adopted by Rawls, especially in Rawls’ later works when he rejects 
capitalist welfare state and argues in favor of property-owning democracy 
and liberal socialism . This can be seen in the third chapter, where Baccarini 
discusses genetic interventions and distributive justice and, though he takes 
an egalitarian approach and takes into consideration questions of justice, he 
still emphasizes the maximal protection of individual freedoms . Third, unlike 
Rawls, Baccarini claims that the conclusions that are still contested and con-
troversial within the scientific community can represent legitimate grounds 
(premises) for public justification . This move towards Kitcher’s position can 
be explained by Baccarini’s wider conception of public reason – since he ap-
plies the constrains of public reason on the debate on the use of some medical 
and biotechnological practices (and not only on the debate on constitutional 
essentials), he needs a broader set of eligible premises . Baccarini argues that, 
since all scientists generally accept the same scientific methods, and disagree 
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only regarding the final conclusions, these conclusions can be used in the 
process of public justification since they are grounded in (or produced by) 
scientific procedures all reasonable citizens (or scientists) can endorse .
In the rest of the first chapter Baccarini defends the idea of public rea-
son from various objections put forward by David Miller, Colin Farrelly and 
Jonathan Wolff . He upgrades his position to make it better suited to answer 
these objections – since (unlike Rawls) he applies the constrains of public 
reason to all laws, public policies and political decisions, Baccarini has to 
demonstrate how could this procedure work in the real world (even more 
than Rawls has), but he also has to take into consideration the consequences 
(or costs) of changing some existing (possibly unjust) laws . By adjusting his 
position to answer the objections by Miller, Farelly and especially Wolff, Bac-
carini makes it stronger and easier to apply on real life politics .
Having established how the political decisions should be justified in or-
der to be legitimate, Baccarini starts by applying this model to some biotech-
nologies whose moral permissibility is (still) a subject of a vivid debate . He 
starts the second chapter by applying the constrains of public reason to the 
debate on genetic interventions . This is a very demanding task since genetic 
interventions will predominantly be done to human embryos, and not to 
adult citizens . Baccarini argues from the liberal standpoint and assumes that 
these interventions will be done by the parents (and not by the state), so the 
central question becomes when is it legitimate for parents to intervene in 
the genetic code of their children . Though Baccarini argues from the liberal 
standpoint, he follows Mill and Barry and endorses the idea that, though 
parents usually are the best caretakers for their children, they do not have 
the right to treat children as their private property, but should instead treat 
them as prospective agents and future free and equal persons . Consequently, 
the only legitimate genetic interventions are those that could be reasonably 
accepted by future persons as free and equal . Interventions that remove some 
generally recognized disabilities or add some talents without removing oth-
ers are therefore legitimate, and Baccarini ends up accepting a form of well-
known bioethical primum non nocere principle . Adding some new talents for 
the cost of removing others might thus be seen as harming a child, since a 
prospective agent might reasonably argue that he or she was wronged when 
some of the talents were removed, presumably those that could help in lead-
ing a good life according to his or her conception of the good . Baccarini care-
fully weights and evaluates many other different arguments and objections 
rooted deep in the discussion on genetic interventions before moving to the 
new challenge and the family of objections claiming that genetic interven-
tions are unjust .
Since freedom is not the only value we care about, some argue that ge-
netic interventions could be rejected because they encourage and increase 
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social and economic inequalities . Therefore, allowing genetic interventions 
that could give some (future) citizens, mostly those who are already rich since 
their parents were able to afford them these expensive treatments, an ad-
ditional increase of their talents and abilities, might lead to the increase of 
existing inequalities . In the third chapter Baccarini argues that such scenarios 
should be allowed as long as they meet the difference principle: genetic inter-
ventions that improve someone’s talents and abilities are legitimate (and just!) 
as long as the resulting unequal distribution of resources is to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society . He dismisses the worries 
that the use of genetic enhancement will decrease the social solidarity, as well 
as that these biotechnologies could lead to the accumulation of great political 
power in the hands of a (rich and genetically enhanced) minority . It seems 
that his view here (at least partly) diverges from the later Rawlsian position, 
turning out to be a little less egalitarian than later Rawls .
The full strength of Baccarini’s approach is probably best seen in the 
fourth and the fifth chapter, where he discusses cloning and the extension of 
human lifespan . Many positions that oppose these practices offer arguments 
by appealing to controversial moral doctrines and conceptions of the good, 
like the idea that human reproduction has a particular natural order which 
has a normative power, or the idea that by indefinitely extending our lifespan 
and becoming virtually immortal we would lose our human nature and hu-
man identity . These arguments are unable to fit within the constraints of the 
public reason (i .e . they cannot be accepted by all reasonable citizens) and 
therefore cannot constitute a legitimate reason for banning human cloning 
and the extension of human lifespan . Of course, Baccarini argues, there might 
be other arguments against these biotechnologies that can be introduced as 
public reasons . Worrying that cloning practices might damage the dignity 
of future persons by jeopardizing their uniqueness, as well as claiming that 
virtual immortality might lead to overpopulation problems, are public ways 
of arguing against these biotechnologies . However, Baccarini argues that, al-
though these reasons might have public form and be free of the influence of 
contested comprehensive doctrines, they still represent bad public reasons . 
namely, since we do not think of twins as those whose human dignity has 
been damaged because they are not genetically unique, we have no reason 
to think that clones will face the same problem . Similarly, we can enact laws 
that make people choose whether they want to reproduce or to extend their 
lifespan, thus removing the threat of overpopulation . Baccarini discusses 
these and other similar arguments in detail and defends both cloning and 
extension of human lifespan as freedoms that should be protected .
The sixth and final chapter discusses whether the state can legitimately 
require people to undergo certain procedures that will improve their moral 
reasoning . This is related to the recent work of Persson and Savulescu, who 
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argue that the rapid development of technology has enabled us to harm other 
people more efficiently and in many different ways, but has also developed 
weapons and instruments that could lead to the Ultimate Harm, i .e . the de-
struction of conditions that permit a valuable life (e .g . nuclear weapons or cli-
mate change) . Since our moral reasoning has been evolving rather slowly, we 
are subject to many biases that cannot be removed by moral education – we 
need moral bioenhancement to cope with moral challenges caused by the 
rapid technological growth . Baccarini discusses several arguments by John 
Harris and Robert Sparrow, and ends up agreeing that there are valid public 
reasons in favour of moral bioenhancement . This does not imply, however, 
that these are conclusive reasons that everyone can see as sufficient for the 
legitimacy of state’s coercive power regarding moral bioenchantment . Bacca-
rini himself, in the final parts of the chapter, argues in favour of less coercive 
measures .
This book represents the cornerstone of an ambitious project that analy-
ses important moral issues from the standpoint of political philosophy . It rep-
resents a valuable read for bioethicists and moral and political philosophers, 
but also for politicians and policy-makers . While recognizing the importance 
of this project and the value of the book, some Rawlsians might, however, 
argue that Baccarini’s approach is overly focused on the maximal protection 
of (non-basic) freedoms, thus jeopardizing some other important values and 
principles, like the fair equality of opportunity .
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